ESTA NOCHE viernes 15 enero 2016

ESTA NOCHE, donde usted se entera no de todo lo que ocurre, sino de lo que necesita saber.

MENU DEL DIA

ü  La encuesta Datum de enero confirma a Keiko Fujimori en el primer lugar (35%), devuelve a PPK al segundo (14%), relega a César Acuña al tercero (bajando a 10%), mantiene a Alan García en el cuarto (6%) y confirma en el quinto a Julio Guzmán (4%).

ü  El BCR volvió a elevar la tasa de interés en soles, para ubicarla en 4,0%. La inflación anual llegó a 4,40% en diciembre pasado

ü  Las bolsas de China volvieron a caer hoy. Puede haber una nueva devaluación del yuan

La opinión en MEDIA COLUMNA representa exclusivamente a su autor. Usted puede reenviar y publicar libre y gratuitamente cualquier MEDIA COLUMNA tomándola de este correo o de

jorgemorelli.blogspot.com

MEDIA COLUMNA

Room mates

en el camerino

Jorge Morelli

@jorgemorelli1

jorgemorelli.blogspot.com

La alianza de Alan García con Lourdes Flores no es un matrimonio de conveniencia ni una convivencia de amigos con derechos. Es una amistad de compañeros de cohabiltación -room mates, digamos- de un camerino de ensayo en preparación de una última función.

¿Qué saca cada uno de este arreglo?

La dama, primero, consigue una salida airosa del callejón en que se había convertido su partido, el Popular Cristiano. Un espectáculo deplorable delante de todo el vecindario, un horroroso pleito a gritos en lo que queda de la vieja casa señorial, no es lugar para una dama. Un boleto a cualquier parte, que permitía salvar la cara del bochorno, le ha proporcionado una salida digna (aunque sea con pañuelo en la cabeza y gafas oscuras). Una fuga hacia adelante, a la ilusión de una nueva vida.

El ex presidente, por su parte, obtiene algo de valor inapreciable, que ha buscado por décadas: un certificado anticorrupción y de buena conducta en cuestiones morales emitido por una política de conducta intachable y con credibilidad en la opinión pública. El aval de Lourdes vale casi tanto como una indulgencia del purgatorio.

Los desagradables aspectos crematísticos del contrato de cohabitación no deben engañar respecto de sus prometedoras posibilidades. Cierto es que, hasta el momento, el arreglo no ha dado frutos a juzgar por los modestos resultados de las encuestas de enero. Pero aún no ha comenzado la función.

Todo depende de que el ex presidente haga un poco de magia, como en campañas anteriores, para salir del montón al que se ve relegado y donde se halla incómodo. No sabemos aún, sin embargo, si el vino viejo de los mítines tiene todavía clientes entre los jóvenes e indignados ocupantes de las redes sociales.

Pero aún están ambos a tiempo de dar su mejor función, un gran final de ópera digno de Pinkerton y Butterfly. Tomemos asiento.

  

REPORTE DE NOTICIAS en Internet

 Las siguientes notas periodísticas de política y economía han sido seleccionadas, editadas y ordenadas

temáticamente. No se las debe citar como tomadas directamente de sus fuentes originales, las mismas que se indican sólo como una forma de reconocer el crédito y agradecer la cortesía.

LIBERTAD ECONOMICA, GLOBALIZACION, REFORMAS, INVERSION

ESTA NOCHE (tomado de El Comercio)

Por segundo mes consecutivo, el directorio del BCR elevó la tasa de interés en soles para ubicarla en 4,0%. Indicó que ese nivel es “compatible” con la proyección de la inflación.

La inflación ha aumentado a causa de la devaluación del sol y el consiguiente aumento de precios de todo lo importado. La inflación anual llegó a 4,40% en diciembre pasado.

ESTA NOCHE (tomado de El Comercio)

Las empresas refinadoras Petroperú y Repsol redujeron ayer los precios de los gasoholes entre S/ 0,19 y S/ 0,39.

Petroperú y Repsol importan derivados del petróleo para producir gasohol y diésel. Importan en dólares, por lo que el tipo de cambio es una variable.

Con el dólar al alza (14% en doce meses), la caída del precio internacional del petróleo es contrarrestada solo en parte por el alza del dólar.

Según Germán Velásquez, presidente de Petroperú, el año pasado los productos que importaron solo disminuyeron 7% en soles.

Sus cifras, sin embargo, son cuestionadas por el Banco Central de Reserva y por las estaciones de servicio.

El BCR dice que pudieron bajar 19 puntos  porcentuales adicionales, en tanto las segundas  dicen que, en realidad, Petro-Perú incrementó sus precios en un 3%.

La necesidad de dinero de Petroperú para financiar la refinería de Talara hacen a la entidad doblemente sospechosa.

Un segundo actor en la cadena es el Estado que cobra un Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo de Combustibles de alrededor de un sol por galón.

Según Petroperú, las estaciones de servicio han aumentado sus márgenes de ganancia hasta 24%. “Los márgenes promedio de las estaciones de servicio se ha mantenido entre 8% y 10%”, afirman estas.

El Comercio

El presidente del directorio de PetroPerú, Germán Velásquez Salazar, informó que a la fecha el proyecto de la refinería de Talara tiene un avance del 30%.

“El 2019 debe entrar en operación”, anunció. Es “un modelo a nivel sudamericano”, dijo.

EL Comercio, AFP

El presidente de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, decretó hoy un "estado de emergencia económica" por 60 días. La gaceta no ha publicado en internet las medidas a tomar, sólo un sumario.
Maduro había anunciado un plan de impulso de la producción frente a la dependencia casi total del petróleo -fuente del 96% de divisas-, cuyos precios han caído por debajo de 30 dólares el barril.
El país sufre una severa escasez de alimentos y medicinas, una inflación de más de 200% y un déficit fiscal de alrededor del 20%.

El Comercio, DPA

Las bolsas de China siguieron cayendo hoy. El Shanghai Composite Index cayó un 3,55%. El Shenzhen Component Index retrocedió un 3,35%, mientras el ChiNext Index -de valores tecnológicos- bajó 2,86%.

La presión devaluadora sobre la moneda china es un factor principal.

Desde principios de año, las Bolsas chinas cayeron 18%.

El próximo martes se darán a conocer las cifras de crecimiento de 2015. Los expertos cuentan con un aumento del producto interior bruto (PIB) de 6,9%.

El Comercio, Project Syndicate

La economía china ante su gran muralla

Mohamed A. El-Erian

La reciente caída del renminbí provocó turbulencias en las bolsas chinas y llevó al gobierno del país asiático a suspender las transacciones dos veces la semana pasada…

(…)

La crisis financiera global de 2008, sumada a la decepcionante recuperación posterior de las economías avanzadas, imprimió más urgencia al intento chino de pasar de un modelo de crecimiento basado en las inversiones y la demanda externa a otro sostenido por el consumo interno.

(…)

…los funcionarios chinos han apelado últimamente a la depreciación de su moneda.

A una devaluación sorpresiva el pasado agosto le siguió una serie de correcciones diarias menores en el tipo de cambio del mercado onshore, todas ellas con el objetivo de aumentar el atractivo de los bienes chinos en el extranjero y al mismo tiempo acelerar la sustitución de importaciones en China. La depreciación del renminbí fue incluso mayor en el mercado offshore.

Las devaluaciones de la moneda china se inscriben dentro de una tendencia más amplia de la que han participado las economías emergentes y avanzadas los últimos años.

Poco después de la crisis financiera global, Estados Unidos apeló a una política de fuerte expansión monetaria, caracterizada por tipos de interés cercanos a cero y compra de activos a gran escala, lo que debilitó el dólar...

(…).

En concreto, los mercados temen que la devaluación del renminbí pueda “robar” crecimiento a otros países...

(…)

China viene mostrando más interés en internacionalizar gradualmente su sistema financiero. En particular, hace poco logró convencer al Fondo Monetario Internacional para que agregara el renminbí a la canasta de monedas que determina el valor de los Derechos Especiales de Giro, la unidad que usa el FMI para las operaciones con los 188 países que lo integran.

Ese paso, que coloca al renminbí a la par de las principales monedas de intercambio mundial (el dólar estadounidense, el euro, la libra esterlina y el yen) mejorará su aceptación por los sectores público y privado en el sistema monetario internacional.

(…)

El Comercio, EFE

Washington. Los aspirantes a la nominación del Partido Republicano que se enfrentaron hoy en un debate a siete en Charleston (Carolina del Sur) rebatieron uno por uno el optimismo desplegado por el presidente de Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, el pasado martes en su discurso sobre el Estado de la Unión. Barack Obama aseguró que es pura "palabrería" hablar de "declive" de la economía estadounidense.

"El martes por la noche escuché un cuento por parte de Barack Obama", espetó nada más empezar el debate el gobernador de Nueva Jersey, Chris Christie.
"La idea de que estamos mejor hoy que el día que Barack Obama inició su mandato pertenece a un universo alternativo", coincidió el exgobernador de Florida Jeb Bush.
Uno de los que se mostró más contundente contra el mensaje de optimismo expresado por el presidente fue el favorito a la nominación según las encuestas, el magnate Donald Trump.

Financial Times

Globalization 2.0, an optimistic outlook

This is the text of a speech delivered by the editor of the Financial Times at the inaugural Nikkei-FT symposium in Tokyo on January 15 2016.

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, it is an honour to speak at the inaugural Nikkei-Financial Times symposium on Japan and the World. For more than a century, the Nikkei, like the FT, has served as a trusted chronicler of globalisation and Japan’s own special contribution.

On the morning of May 18 1969, readers of the Nikkei woke up to a cracking scoop. Mitsubishi Heavy was in talks about an alliance with Chrysler. The liberalisation of capital controls, opening up Japan to the world, had begun. The fruit of those talks is what we now know as Mitsubishi Motors.

Later that day the deputy CEO of Mitsubishi Heavy arrived back at Haneda airport. He was besieged by reporters from various news organisations. “It’s just like in this morning’s Nikkei,” he declared.

The reporters on that story won a Japan Newspaper award. It was the first of a string of epoch-shaping scoops: the alliance in November 1970 between General Motors and Isuzu; Toyota’s first production in North America in Fremont, California in 1982; Nissan’s move into the UK in 1984; Toyota’s first solo US plant in 1985. The Nikkei broke them all.

When I was a foreign correspondent in Washington, Brussels and New York, I saw how a genuine news scoop can set the pulse racing. As an editor, I have come to appreciate the value of the “scoop of interpretation” — the insightful story which connects the dots for the savvy reader and investor.

Thanks to our network of more than 100 foreign correspondents, the FT can deliver this brand of quality journalism. And thanks to our new global media alliance with Nikkei, we are ideally placed to offer fresh insights from selective co-operation and cross-fertilisation. This symposium speaks to that goal.

Today, I have been invited to speak about Globalisation 2.0. This is both timely and appropriate because we are entering a new phase in the evolution of the world economy. I will look shortly at the geopolitical and geoeconomic trends that characterise “Globalisation 2.0” — but first let’s inspect the wider historical canvas.

For 500 years the west was on the rise, culminating between the late 1970s and 2007, in Globalisation 1.0 — an age of continuing “mini-revolutions” brought about by rapid economic, political and especially technological change.

These changes — the open system of trade, information flows and the spread of technology — occurred on the terms, and in the image of, the “west”. And I am using the term “west” not geographically as it includes Japan, itself a greater moderniser since the 1868 Meiji restoration, and Australia and New Zealand. What I mean by “west” is the liberal market-based democratic values that have propelled global growth since the mid-20th century.

The end of the cold war further accelerated institutional change: the creation of the EU in 1993, and launch of the single currency in 1999; the 1994 Uruguay Round agreement on global trade liberalisation and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation; the opening of a market economy in communist China followed by entry into the WTO in 2001; and far-reaching changes in national and international laws driven by the deregulatory spirit of the Thatcher-Reagan era.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about an even bigger shift. The “client states” of the world’s two superpowers — the US and the Soviet Union — were no longer hemmed in by the geopolitical constraints of the cold war and were now free to pursue their own development.

As the “winner” of the cold war, many states chose to follow the advice of the “western” model prescribed by the US-influenced global institutions: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and WTO-led trade liberalisation — the so-called Washington consensus.

At the end of the cold war, around 1bn people counted themselves in market economies. With the rise of emerging markets and the transition in India and China that number rose to between 3bn and 4bn people — a truly seismic shift.

The progressive abandonment of controls on capital, goods, services and labour — epitomised in this period by the creation of Europe’s single market and the birth of the euro — reached its apogee in the summer of 2007. At that point world financial flows had reached 14.7 per cent of global GDP.

We find ourselves in the second half of the second decade of the 21st century at the advent of a new age.

And now we find ourselves in the second half of the second decade of the 21st century at the advent of a new age: “Globalisation 2.0.” The old western-dominated Globalisation 1.0, which assumed the universality of one global culture, has passed. Today, Globalisation 2.0 means the interdependence of several identities or cultures characterised by new forms of non-western modernity.

This new era, while long in the making, was hastened by the 2008 global financial crash. Since the Great Crash, cross-border capital flows have fallen to 3.1 per cent of global gross domestic product, less than one-quarter of their pre-crisis peak. This is the result of a massive re-regulation of the banking sector marked by the repatriation of capital, curbs on proprietary trading and the ring fencing of commercial banking from investment banking. We might call this the partial “disintegration” of the financial system.

The benefits of the western-dominated “Globalisation 1.0” system over the past 30 years led to the rise of the emerging economies. The wider G20 grouping reflects their increasing weight. Yet those same countries are experiencing shocks as a result of the slowdown in China, inadequate local governance, meaningful economic reforms, and, crucially, excessive borrowing at home, both among corporates and households. Think Brazil.

Now these one-time market favourites face a period of prolonged and painful adjustment, especially those overly dependent on commodity cycles. As Robert Zoellick, former president of the World Bank and US trade representative, has remarked: some of the governments of the so-called Brics countries started to believe their own press releases.

Globalisation has made borders porous to information, foreign investment and popular culture but also to cyber crime, pollution and human trafficking

To date, we have witnessed a reappraisal but not a repudiation of globalisation. Globalisation has made borders porous to information, foreign investment and popular culture but also to cyber crime, pollution and human trafficking. Security is harder to achieve and to maintain. National governments are desperate to regain a measure of control.

So while the flow of ideas continues across borders, there are signs of a backlash — from the great firewall of China to Europe’s insistence post-Snowden on locating data storage on its own continent. The internet is not (yet) Balkanised but the age of the seamless global internet has almost certainly passed.

The rise of radical Islam marks a second significant geopolitical shift. A bloody struggle for supremacy is unfolding between Shia and Sunni Islam in a Middle East where postcolonial borders are being erased and the old autocratic order breaking down. Al-Qaeda, Isis and other terrorist groupings may not pose an existential threat to the west, but their newfound global reach poses a clear and present danger.

Finally, as I have witnessed during my visits over the past 15 years, China’s steady rise challenges the postwar order in Asia. China’s GDP has quintupled since 1990 but it is a premature superpower. The ruling Communist party is striving to create jobs, raise the quality of economic growth and preserve its own legitimacy. At the same time, and perhaps not coincidentally, China has become increasingly assertive in the Pacific, interrupting investment and trade with neighbours who stand up to its territorial claims.

China has also actively begun to reshape the postwar international economic order, which it views as skewed in favour of American and western interests. It is a rulemaker now, not just a rule-taker. The launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is one example; but so are the Brics Bank and Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative for connecting western China to Central Asia, as well as the seaborne route through the West Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Gulf and on to east Africa.

Let me now turn to how I see things unfolding.

First, the Federal Reserve’s recent move to raise interest rates suggests we are finally moving from crisis management to a semblance of normality in policymaking. Mervyn King, former governor of the Bank of England, described the period after the Lehman Brothers collapse as “wartime”. By that he meant governments and central banks taking extraordinary measures such as bank nationalisation, bank recapitalisation and the launch of quantitative easing in the US, Europe and Japan.

The Fed’s interest rate hike signals, finally, that we have reached the beginning of the end of unconventional monetary policy as a means of generating economic growth.

In Europe, we see a fragile truce. The eurozone crisis has moved from acute to chronic. Greece remains in the eurozone, just. The European Central Bank, under the astute leadership of Mario Draghi, has bought time with its pledge to “do whatever it takes” to stop deflation. But the ECB’s limited QE measures have done little more than buy time for governments to take the necessary structural reforms to restore economic growth.

There is a common thread here with the US and China. The Fed’s move makes it imperative that Congress (and a new president) consider fiscal and structural measures such as tax reform and, yes, immigration reform to inject new dynamism into the US economy. At the same time, Silicon Valley and the shale gas energy revolution are showing, once again, the power of the private sector to drive growth in the US.

On China, much has been written about Beijing’s mis-steps in managing the exchange rate and intervening in the stock market. Yet the ultimate test will surely be implementation of the Communist party’s five-year plan. This recognises the central place of structural economic reform from state-owned enterprises to the labour market.

These reforms are intended to propel the shift from an investment-reliant, credit-fuelled, export-heavy, low cost manufacturing growth to one based more on consumer demand, services and environmentally friendly growth; as well as opening the capital account and the internationalisation of the renminbi. However, after the tumultuous market movements this new year and the ferocious anti-corruption campaign targeting Chinese business, I would say the game is finely balanced.

We have moved from an era...where monetary policy was doing all the work to a post-crisis era where the burden falls more on politicians to take responsibility for structural reforms to generate economic growth

To sum up: we have moved from what Claire Jones, our ECB correspondent in Frankfurt, recently described as “peak central banking”, where monetary policy was doing all the work to a post-crisis era where the burden falls more on politicians to take responsibility for structural reforms to generate economic growth.

Are they up to it? Sitting in Europe, where populists have toppled or laid siege to governments in Greece, Poland, France and Spain, the omens do not look especially good.

As for America, the improbable rise of Donald Trump may not presage the arrival of a middle-market hotelier-cum-reality TV host in the White House in November; but it does reflect how a large segment of the public feels unhinged by globalisation and spurned by the political elite.

The UK faces similar strains on inequality, but not to the same degree. The Conservative party, defying all predictions, won an absolute majority in parliament after a period of austerity. The Tory government, guided by David Cameron and his putative successor George Osborne, is radically reshaping the state, reforming the welfare system, and increasing the incentives to work. The UK is now close to full employment.

Let me turn briefly to the Japan experience. It has become fashionable to speak of two “lost decades” after the collapse of the late 1980s bubble and the onset of deflation. By this account, Japanese business failed to fully exploit the postwar economic miracle, especially in hardware manufacturing. Apart from its groundbreaking lead in robotics, it largely missed the software revolution. One Japanese diplomat told me, half jokingly, that the greatest Japanese export in the past 25 years has been cultural: Japanese cuisine. Sushi as soft power! (Well, we should add the Japanese film industry.)

In fact, historians may well pay more attention to the innate qualities of the Japanese people: discipline, hard work and resilience in adversity. These strengths helped the country to recover from not one but two devastating earthquakes and make Tokyo one of the great modern cities. They may also take note of Japan’s cleanliness, top class education, healthcare and transportation systems and its ability (unlike the US) to deliver a national strategy. And, crucially, they would remember that Japan has since the 1870s combined modernisation with the preservation of national culture.

Today, Japan faces a choice about Globalisation 2.0. How far is it ready to open up further to the rest of the world, to temper its traditional homogeneity with a willingness to exploit global networks, interact with other cultures and, yes, embrace English as the dominant language of international business?

Fewer interpreters and more women in the workforce — think of the gains in productivity!

On my last trip to Tokyo, a senior Japanese official told me that Abenomics represented the “last chance” for Japan to break out of deflation and restore its role as a front rank economic and political power.

Abenomics emphasises — alongside monetary and fiscal policy — the importance of structural economic reform such as more women in the workforce, corporate governance, improving productivity and the role of external catalysts such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. There is evidence of success; nearly 760,000 women have entered the workforce. Many are part-time jobs and equality is a distant prospect, but this is nevertheless real progress in exploiting one of Japan’s great natural resources: women.

The reformers [will] prevail, from Beijing to Tokyo, Delhi, Brussels, London and Washington

The FT has no party political affiliation. But I would say that Abenomics — if implemented in full — could turn out to be an effective antidote to the theory of secular stagnation, which has gained currency in the west. And Japan will have a chance to showcase its economic and political power when it plays host to this year’s G7 meetings.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have sought to sketch some of the main characteristics of Globalisation 2.0. How bullish should we be about the next 10 to 15 years?

The less benign prognosis is that the forces of resistance to Globalisation 2.0 prevail. Populists in the mould of Farage, Le Pen and Trump do not necessarily assume power but they define the political debate. The reformers are cowed. The forces of fragmentation gain ascendancy from the Middle East to Europe. Nationalism rises in China, Russia and the rest of Asia. Globalisation 2.0 starts to look like globalisation before 1914.

There is, however, a more optimistic outlook. The reformers prevail, from Beijing to Tokyo, Delhi, Brussels, London and Washington. China continues to globalise and opens its capital account — a potentially huge shift in global financial power. Japan continues to reform apace and grows closer to India, which itself, finally, becomes a big player. The shift of economic power eastward to Asia accelerates. And the west continues to play a constructive role.

We do not know what the future brings. But here’s what we do know. The new global media alliance between Nikkei and the FT is in fact an act of Globalisation 2.0. Together we will be there to tell the story. Without fear and without favour.

ELECCIONES, PARTIDOS, ENCUESTAS, MEDIOS, PSICOSOCIALES

ESTA NOCHE (tomado de Peru21)

Luego de registrar un notable crecimiento entre noviembre y diciembre en la última encuesta de CPI, la intención de voto por César Acuña descendió de 12% a 10% en un mes en la encuesta Pulso Perú, de Datum.

El líder de Alianza para el Progreso bajó en todas las regiones: en Lima (de 8% a 6%), en el norte (de 15% a 13%), en el sur (de 14% a 10%), en el centro (de 11% a 9%) y en el oriente (de 20% a 16%).

En cambio, Julio Guzmán dejó el pelotón de los “otros” y logró ubicarse en quinto lugar, con 4%. En la edición de diciembre, el candidato de Todos por el Perú –que se caracteriza por una fuerte campaña en las redes sociales– registraba un escaso 0.4%. Su subida se dio en casi todo el país. Logró 6% en Lima, 5% en el oriente, 4% en el norte y 3% en el sur. Así, desplazó al sexto lugar al líder de Perú Posible, Alejandro Toledo, quien cae de 4% a 3%.

La expectativa de los electores frente a la candidatura de Pedro Pablo Kuczynski también parece congelada. Pese a que realiza una constante actividad proselitista en la capital y en provincias, su intención de voto continúa igual que en diciembre: 14%.

Quien tampoco logra impactar es Alan García. Tras su alianza con el PPC, el líder del Apra baja de 7% a 6%.

En el primer lugar de las preferencias no hay cambios. El estudio confirma que Keiko Fujimori se mantiene con 35% por tercer mes consecutivo. No obstante, el apoyo a la lideresa de Fuerza Popular en Lima baja de 33% a 27%, compensado con un crecimiento en el norte (de 42% a 44%) y en el oriente (de 33% a 43%).